Interference No. 103,586
Conception is a question of law. Kridl v. McCormick, 105 F.3d 1446, 1449, 41
USPQ2d 1686, 1689(Fed. Cir. 1997); Bosies v. Benedict, 27 F.3d 539, 542, 30 USPQ2d
1862, 1864 (Fed. Cir. 1994) and Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1168, 25 USPQ2d 1601,
1604 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Conception is defined as the formation “in the mind of the inventor
of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter
to be applied in practice.” Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1376, 231USPQ at 87 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
By this definition, conception consists of two parts, the idea and the means to carry out the
idea. Conception must include every limitation in the count, and every limitation must have
been known to the inventor at the time of the alleged conception. Coleman, 754 F.2d at
359, 224 USPQ at 862. Conception of an inventive process involves proof of mental
possession of the steps of an operative process and, if necessary, of means to carry it out
to such a degree that nothing remains but routine skill for effectuation thereof. Alpert v.
Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 134 USPQ 296 (CCPA 1962). Since conception takes place in the
mind of the inventor, additionally there must be disclosure to and corroboration by a third
party. For it is well settled that the inventor’s testimony standing alone is insufficient to
prove conception, Price, 988 F.2d at 1194, 26 USPQ at 1036. In evaluating whether there
is conception, a rule of reason is applied, the rule does not however dispense with the
requirement of some evidence of independent corroboration. Coleman, 754 F.2d at 359,
224 USPQ at 862.
For conception, Brown rely upon the statements of coinventor Reiss, and on the
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