Interference No. 103,586
We hold, based on the record before us, that Brown have not proved, by a
preponderance of evidence, an actual reduction to practice of the subject matter of the
count prior to March 6, 1990.
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With respect to Reiss’s activities of September 11 and 20, 1989 , Brown argue that
if the Board finds that an inhibitor substance need not be added to the process, then the
work of Reiss, satisfies the limitations of the count. The Board does not so find. The count
clearly requires that a test/candidate substance be included in the assay in order to identify
whether the substance serves as an inhibitor of farnesyl activity. To constitute an actual
reduction to practice, it must be shown that an experiment satisfies all the limitations of the
count in issue. Szekely, 455 F.2d at 1396, 173 USPQ at 119; Schur v. Muller, 372 F.2d
546, 550, 152 USPQ 605, 609 (CCPA 1967). Therefore in order for Brown to prove
priority based upon an actual reduction to practice of the process count, Brown must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the performed experiment carried out each step
of the process. Brown made no attempt to do this. With respect to Reiss’s activities of
September 25, 1989, Brown, in their brief (page 32), argue that the assay Reiss
14
performed on this date incorporated a purified ras (5Fg/ml) as the substrate, C-
FPP(2000pmol/tube) as the farnesyl pyrophosphate, purified FT in supernatant fraction
Barbacid correctly notes that Brown’s preliminary statement alleges the earliest6
date of September 25, 1989 for reduction to practice. Accordingly, the earliest date that
Brown could possibly establish for an actual reduction to practice is September 25, 1989.
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.629(a).
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