Ex parte OVSHINSKY - Page 5




               Appeal No. 1997-3636                                                                                                
               Application No. 08/584,642                                                                                          


                       Moreover, Takagi discloses that the chromium is jetted                                                      
               from the crucible 23 as "a vapor of metallic chromium" (col.                                                        
               4,                                                                                                                  
               line 50).  Such a vapor does not constitute "a fluidic stream                                                       
               of said molten first component," as called for by claim 1,                                                          
               since, as argued by appellant, supra, molten material is                                                            
               material in a liquid phase, not in a vapor phase.  Any doubt                                                        
               as to whether this claim limitation calls for the first                                                             
               component to be molten when in the stream is removed when the                                                       
               claim language is read in light                                                                                     
               of the disclosure,  in which the fluidic stream 7 of the4                                                                                      
               melted first component from crucible 3 is described as being                                                        
               "liquid" (p. 10, penultimate line), in a "molten state" (p.                                                         
               12, line 6), and "molten" (p. 12, last line; p. 13, line 7).                                                        


                       As stated in In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 444                                                                                                          
               USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997):                                                                                 
                       the PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed                                                             
                       claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words                                                         
                       in their ordinary usage as they would be understood                                                         
                       by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into                                                            
                       account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions                                                        
                       or otherwise that may be afforded by the written                                                            
                       description contained in the applicant's                                                                    
                       specification.                                                                                              
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