Appeal No. 1997-3822 Application No. 08/406,668 claims 5, 14, and 24. However, as will appear, we are3 reversing the rejection of all of these claims for failure to demonstrate the prima facie obviousness of the "single address" requirement common to all of the independent claims, which requirement the examiner and appellant apparently agree refers to the ability to transmit standard telephone calls and voice-mail messages to a party using a single telephone number for that party. The examiner argues that when voice-mail messages are sent to memory 35 in the receiving telephone device instead of to memory 41 in exchanger 4, the calling party is able to use the same telephone number to reach the receiving telephone device whether making a standard telephone call or sending a voice-mail message to memory 35 (id.). Appellant offers the following reasons why it would not have been obvious to use the same telephone number for both types of communication: In Nagata, a casual reference is made to the fact that the receiving device 3' could be a standard telephone. Note, however, that there is no teaching 3The Brief (at 17-20) recites the limitations of claims 5, 14, and 24 and argues that those claims are patentable over Nagata for the reasons given with respect to claim 1. -7-Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007