Appeal No. 1998-0460 Page 6
Application No. 08/480,765
Anticipation and Obviousness of Claims 12-16,
18, 34-63, and 68-70
We begin by noting standards for anticipation and
obviousness. Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478, 42 USPQ2d 1550,
1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997), established the following standard for
anticipation.
A prior art reference anticipates a claim only
if the reference discloses, either expressly or
inherently, every limitation of the claim. See
Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d
628, 631, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
“[A]bsence from the reference of any claimed element
negates anticipation." Kloster Speedsteel AB v.
Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1571, 230 USPQ 81, 84
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532, 28 USPQ2d 1955, 1956
(Fed. Cir. 1993), in turn, established the following standard
for obviousness.
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. Section 103, the
examiner bears the initial burden of presenting a
prima facie case of obviousness. In re Oetiker, 977
F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir.
1992). Only if that burden is met, does the burden
of coming forward with evidence or argument shift
to the applicant. Id. "A prima facie case of
obviousness is established when the teachings from
the prior art itself would appear to have suggested
the claimed subject matter to a person of ordinary
skill in the art." In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 782,
26 USPQ2d 1529, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting In re
Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1051, 189 USPQ 143, 147
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Next
Last modified: November 3, 2007