Ex parte BOATMAN et al. - Page 6




               Appeal No. 1999-0712                                                                       Page 6                 
               Application No. 08/748,669                                                                                        


                      The appellants do not contest the examiner's position with regard to these proposed                        
               modifications.  Rather, the appellants argue (brief, pages 5-10) that, even if the Schatz device                  
               were modified as proposed by the examiner, the radiopaque material coated on the connector                        
               members would be located internally of the whole device 70' and thus between and spaced                           
               from the ends thereof, rather than "at an end of the stent" as required by claim 41.  This                        
               argument is based on the appellants' assertion that                                                               
                      [t]here is no logical or rational basis to believe that someone having even                                
                      rudimentary skills in the arts of making and implanting stents would consider the                          
                      so-called central "graft" 70 shown in Figs. 7 and 8 of the Schatz reference to be,                         
                      by itself, a complete and implantable stent, since it has additional implantable                           
                      members connected to it.  Instead, those skilled in the art would refer only to the                        
                      entire graft or prosthesis '70 [sic: 70'] as a stent, and not to its individual                            
                      constituents [brief, page 9].                                                                              
                      In proceedings before it, the PTO applies to the verbiage of claims the broadest                           
               reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one                        
               of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or                 
               otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant's                            
               specification.  In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997).                         
               Moreover, absent an express definition in their specification, the fact that appellants can point to              
               definitions or usages that conform to their interpretation does not make the PTO's definition                     
               unreasonable when the PTO can point to other sources that support its interpretation.  Id., 127                   
               F.2d at 1056, 44 USPQ2d at 1029.                                                                                  









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