Interference No. 102,755
and 8) of the fact that Nedelk's braking system was
subsequently installed on that aircraft.
(f) Crampton affidavit, NR 30-33, all paragraphs,
and NE 363-77. Stimson's objections to this evidence are
unpersuasive for reasons already discussed.
(g) Webb affidavit, NR 27-29, all paragraphs, and NE
308-62. See (f), above.
(h) Nemcheck affidavit, NR 24-26, all paragraphs,
and NE 277-91. See (f), above.
2. Nedelk's case for conception
As explained in Kridl v. McCormick, 105 F.3d 1446,
1449-50, 41 USPQ2d 1686, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1997):
Conception is the formation "in the
mind of the inventor of a definite and
permanent idea of the complete and
operative invention, as it is therefore to
be applied in practice." Coleman v. Dines,
754 F.2d 353, 359, 224 USPQ 857, 862 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (quoting Gunter v. Stream, 573
F.2d 77, 80, 197 USPQ 482, 484 (CCPA 1978))
(emphasis omitted). Conception must
include every feature or limitation of the
claimed invention. Davis v. Reddy, 620
F.2d 885, 889, 205 USPQ 1065, 1069 (CCPA
1980).
"Conception must be proved by
corroborating evidence which shows that the
inventor disclosed to others his 'complete
thought expressed in such clear terms as to
enable those skilled in the art' to make
the invention." Coleman, 754 F.2d at 359,
- 8 -
Page: Previous 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Next
Last modified: November 3, 2007