Interference No. 102,755
224 USPQ at 862 (quoting Fields v. Knowles,
[37 C.C.P.A. 1211], 183 F.2d 593, 601, 86
USPQ 373, 379 (CCPA 1950)). However,
"there is no final single formula that must
be followed in proving corroboration."
Berry v. Webb, [56 C.C.P.A. 1272], 412
F.2d 261, 266, 162 USPQ 170, 174 (CCPA
1969). Rather, the sufficiency of
corroborative evidence is determined by the
"rule of reason." Price [v. Symsek], 988
F.2d [1187,] at 1195, 26 USPQ2d [1031,] at
1037 [(Fed. Cir. 1993)]; Berry, 412 F.2d at
266, 162 USPQ at 173. Accordingly, a
tribunal must make a reasonable analysis of
all of the pertinent evidence to determine
whether the inventor's testimony is
credible. Price, 988 F.2d at 1195, 26 USPQ
at 1037. The tribunal must also bear in
mind the purpose of corroboration, which is
to prevent fraud, by providing independent
confirmation of the inventor's testimony.
See Berry, 412 F.2d at 266, 162 USPQ at 173
("The purpose of the rule requiring
corroboration is to prevent fraud."); Reese
v. Hurst, 661 F.2d 1222, 1125, 211 USPQ
936, 940 (CCPA 1981) ("[E]vidence of
corroboration must not depend solely on the
inventor himself.").
Stimson argues that Nedelk's case for conception
fails because it was not supported by any documentary
evidence:
Not a single piece of paper has been
introduced to establish conception of the
invention prior to February 16, 1988,
Senior Party's filing date.
Not a single piece of paper has been
introduced to establish conception of the
invention by Nedelk prior to August 17,
1988[,] the date Nedelk submitted an
information disclosure statement to the
corporate Patent Screening Committee.
- 9 -
Page: Previous 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Next
Last modified: November 3, 2007