NEDELK V. STIMSON et al. - Page 38



            Interference No. 102,755                                                                   


                    31                                           32                                  
            (FOIA).   In response to Stimson's opposition,  which argues                               
            (at 3-4) that the motion and evidence fail to prove dates for                              
            the acts alleged therein, Nedelk filed a reply  accompanied by33                                  
            new evidence including the deposition testimony by DeYoung                                 
            (NR 502-26) concerning his first affidavit and some affidavits                             
            that are not of record: (a) a December 21, 1994, affidavit by                              
            DeYoung; (b) a December 4, 1994, affidavit by Ray Weber; and                               
            (c) a December 21, 1994, affidavit by Arnold Beck. The APJ                                 
            held that the reply evidence "is not entitled to                                           
            consideration, as it is not directed to new points of argument                             
            raised in the opposition, as required by § 1.638(b).  Instead,                             
            it is directed to deficiencies in the motion that were                                     
            identified in the opposition."   We agree.  It is well settled34                                                     
            that all of the available evidence on which a party intends to                             


              Nedelk's belated XB-70 motion includes a § 1.639(c)31                                                                                   
            request for permission to take the testimony of persons having                             
            knowledge of the XB-70 braking system.  Although the APJ initially                         
            denied the request on the ground that Nedelk had not demonstrated                          
            that the testimony was unavailable at the time the belated motion                          
            was filed (paper No. 62, at 7-8), he reversed himself on                                   
            reconsideration, holding that because the belated § 1.633(a)                               
            motion was filed at the beginning of Nedelk's testimony-in-chief                           
            period, it was reasonable for Nedelk to assume that the requested                          
            testimony need not accompany the motion (paper No. 68, at 7).                              
              Paper No. 49.32                                                                                   
              Paper No. 54.33                                                                                   
              Paper No. 62, at 10.34                                                                                   
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