Interference No. 102,755
whereas Nedelk first learned of DeVlieg's XB-70 allegations
after the close of the preliminary motion period, when he was
served with DeVlieg's motion. While it is true that the facts
in Maier differ in tat respect from those in this
interference, Maier nevertheless stands for the broader
proposition that a party has duty to promptly investigate
apparently relevant prior art. See also English v. Ausnit,
38 USPQ2d 1625, 1640 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1993):
The "sufficient cause" requirement [of
§ 1.645(b) ] is satisfied by showing that43
the motion was filed as soon as the
patentability issue was discovered, unless
the issue could have been discovered
earlier. Maier v. Hanawa, 26 USPQ2d 1606,
1610 (Comm'r Pat. 1992); Magdo v. Kooi, 699
F.2d 1325, 1329-31, 216 USPQ 1033, 1037-38
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
Nedelk next argues that "[i]t is simply not
understood how one has a duty to obtain further information on
subject matter which he does not believe to be claim
defeating, after the time for filing preliminary motions has
expired" (NMB 22). This assertion is unconvincing because it
is not supported by DeYoung's affidavit testimony, quoted
Effective April 21, 1995, the term "sufficient cause" in43
§ 1.645(b) was changed to "good cause" to be consistent with the
terminology used in other interference rules. 1995 Final Rule
Notice, 60 Fed. Reg. at 14,513; 1173 Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark
Office at 57.
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