NEDELK V. STIMSON et al. - Page 51



            Interference No. 102,755                                                                   


            Kojima, 206 USPQ 958, 959 (Comm'r Pats. & Trademarks 1978)                                 
            (using request for reconsideration to present reasons not                                  
            included in the original motion as filed "constitutes                                      
            unjustifiable piecemeal prosecution of the interference[,]                                 
            which is contrary both to the public interest and orderly                                  
            procedure.  See Pritchard v. Loughlin, 360 F.2d 250, 149 USPQ                              
            676 [sic, 361 F.2d 483, 487, 149 USPQ 841, 844] (CCPA                                      
            1966).").                                                                                  
                        The second problem with the argument is that it is                             
            incorrect on the merits.  Belatedness of a party's motion is                               
            not excusable on the ground that the party was waiting for a                               
            decision on a similar motion by another party.  See Jackson v.                             
            Cuntz, 1905 Comm'r Dec. 92, 92, 115 Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark                             
            Office 510 (Comm'r Pats. 1905):                                                            
                              It is said in the affidavit in support                                   
                        of the [Jackson's] motion [to dissolve]                                        
                        that a motion for dissolution was brought                                      
                        by one Brown, who was a party to the                                           
                        proceedings, and such motion was not                                           
                        decided until December 30, 1904.  This                                         
                        seems to be regarded by Jackson as an                                          
                        excuse for not taking steps to make his own                                    
                        motion before December 30; but it is well                                      
                        settled that it constitutes no valid                                           
                        excuse.  (Perrussel v. Wichman, C.D., 1902,                                    
                        228; 99 O.G., 2970).  The pendency of                                          
                        Brown's motion constituted no obstacle to                                      
                        the filing of Jackson's motion, but, on the                                    
                        contrary, it would seem that both might                                        
                        have been filed and considered with                                            
                        advantage at the same time.  To delay one                                      

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