Interference No. 102,755
As Stimson correctly notes, the policy reasons Nedelk offers58
for allowing such agreements (i.e., a PTO policy favoring
amicable resolution of interferences and the economic benefits
of having the on-sale issue decided in the PTO rather than in
litigation) did not appear in the motion and therefore are not
entitled to consideration at final hearing, even though these
policy reasons were considered and rejected in the APJ's
decision on reconsideration. In any event, we are not59
persuaded that the alleged economic benefits and lack of
prejudice outweigh the requirements of the rules and the
decisions interpreting those rules. See Myers v. Feigelman,
455 F.2d 596, 601, 172 USPQ 580, 584 (CCPA 1972):
[T]he [interference] rules are designed to provide
an orderly procedure and the parties are entitled to
rely on their being followed in the absence of such
circumstances as might justify waiving them under
Rule 183. To hold that they may be ignored, in the
absence of such circumstances, merely because no
special damage has been shown would defeat the
purpose of the rules and substantially confuse
interference practice.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the APJ's
decision to dismiss the on-sale motion did not constitute an
abuse of discretion. Consequently, we do not reach the
SMB 31.58
Paper No. 68, at 1-3.59
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