Interference No. 104,190
count interpretation is that interference counts are to be
given the broadest interpretation which they will reasonably
support. Mead v. McKirnan, 585 F.2d 504, 507, 199 USPQ 513,
515-516 (CCPA 1978). Terms in the count are to be given their
ordinary and accustomed meaning. See Johnson Worldwide Assoc.
Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990, 50 USPQ2d 1607, 1610
(Fed. Cir. 1999)(quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa Per
Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249, 48 USPQ2d 1117, 1121 (Fed. Cir.
1998)). Resort to a specification from which a claim on which
the count is based or resort to extrinsic evidence is only
appropriate or necessary when an ambiguity exists in the
count. If an ambiguity is found, resort may be had to the
specification of the patent from which the claims originate to
resolve the ambiguity. See In re Spina, 975 F.2d 854, 856,
24 USPQ2d 1142, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Determination of the
existence of an ambiguity requires consideration of both the
language of the count and the reasonableness of the arguments
indicating the count has different meanings. Kroekel v. Shah,
558 F.2d 29, 31-32, 194 USPQ 544, 546 (CCPA 1977). The mere
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