Ex parte BROWNING et al. - Page 4


          Appeal No. 1998-3276                                                       
          Application No. 08/667,211                                                 


               We reverse the aforementioned rejections for reasons which            
          follow.                                                                    
               The examiner admits that the prior art references do not              
          describe the content of iron contamination in the molten tin               
          alloy dip.  Nevertheless, the examiner alleges that “a process             
          performed [for forming a triniobium tin superconductor] using a            
          [molten tin alloy] dip which does not contain iron would fall              
          within the limitations of the appealed claims.”  (Id. at page              
          4.)  The examiner further states:                                          
                    [T]he examiner sees no reason to assume that an                  
               element [Fe] would be present in the prior art when                   
               that element is not discussed in the prior art and the                
               prior art gives no suggestion or reason to believe                    
               such an element would be present.  At the very least,                 
               the examiner’s position is that any residual or                       
               impurity amounts of iron which could be present in the                
               prior art tin dip...would be a very small amount, i.e.                
               would be an amount within the range of 0-125 ppm as                   
               permitted by the language of the appealed claims.                     
               [Id. at pp. 6-7.]                                                     
               The examiner’s position is without merit.  While unpatented           
          claims must be interpreted by giving words their broadest                  
          reasonable meanings in their ordinary usage, taking into account           
          the written description found in the specification, the                    
          interpretation of the claim language must be “reasonable in                
          light of the totality of the written description.”  In re Baker            




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