Appeal No. 1998-3339 Page 5
Application No. 08/614,459
that the examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-3. Accordingly,
we reverse.
We begin by noting the following principles from In re
Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532, 28 USPQ2d 1955, 1956 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. Section 103, the
examiner bears the initial burden of presenting a
prima facie case of obviousness. In re Oetiker, 977
F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir.
1992).... "A prima facie case of obviousness is
established when the teachings from the prior art
itself would appear to have suggested the claimed
subject matter to a person of ordinary skill in the
art." In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 782, 26 USPQ2d
1529, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Rinehart,
531 F.2d 1048, 1051, 189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 1976)).
With these principles in mind, we consider the examiner's
rejection and the appellants' arguments.
Admitting that Hopkins and Miller “do[] not specifically
teach only ‘sampling data relating to rejected products’,
instead gathering data from various batches which, seemingly,
are composed of both accepted and rejected products[,]”
(Examiner’s Answer at 4, 6), the examiner asserts, "it would
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