Ex Parte LUBOWITZ et al - Page 4



          Appeal No. 1999-1335                                                       
          Application No. 08/463,437                                                 


          appellants would have us believe, whether delays in the                    
          prosecution of the application were caused by the PTO.4  As we             
          indicated above, the appellants do not contest the examiner's              
          determination that appealed claim 47 is patentably indistinct              
          from the claims of the '233 patent.  Under these circumstances,            
          we must uphold the examiner's rejection under the judicially               
          created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as a matter          
          of law.                                                                    
               The appellants argue that "[f]orcing a terminal disclaimer            
          robs him [sic, them] of protection he otherwise would have had if          
          the government had not intervened and caused delay in the                  
          prosecution of his application."  (Appeal brief, page 7.)  This            
          is incorrect.  The examiner would have been justified in                   
          rejecting the appealed claims on obviousness-type double                   
          patenting over the claims of the '233 patent even if no delays             
          had been present.                                                          


                                                                                    
               4                                                                     
                   To the extent that the appellants believe that these delays       
          justify a two-way double patenting test, we note that the facts of the     
          present case are removed from the facts of In re Braat, 937 F.2d 589,      
          592, 19 USPQ2d 1289, 1291-92 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  Unlike Braat, the          
          inventive entity of the present application is the same as that of the     
          '233 patent.  In addition, the invention claimed in the '233 patent is     
          not a later-filed improvement of the present invention.  Further, the      
          claims of the present application and the claims of the application        
          which matured into the '233 patent could have been combined in a           
          single continuation-in-part application.  In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428,       
          1433, 46 USPQ2d 1226, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[B]ecause Berg could         
          have filed the claims of its separate applications in a single             
          application, and it simply chose to file two applications despite          
          nearly identical disclosures, Berg is not entitled to the two-way          
          test.").  In any event, we note that the appellants do not dispute the     
          examiner's determination (answer, p. 6) that the claims of the present     
          application and the claims of the '233 patent are patentably               
          indistinct from each other under the two-way double patenting test.        

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