Appeal No. 1999-1899 Page 10
Application No. 08/932,090
As noted above, Heyl does teach all the limitations of
claim 1. A disclosure that anticipates under 35 U.S.C. § 102
also renders the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103, for
"anticipation is the epitome of obviousness." Jones v. Hardy,
727 F.2d 1524, 1529, 220 USPQ 1021, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
See also In re Fracalossi, 681 F.2d 792, 794, 215 USPQ 569,
571 (CCPA 1982); In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402, 181 USPQ
641, 644 (CCPA 1974). Thus, we affirm the examiner's
rejection of appealed claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Heyl taken together with Ruemelin. However,
for reasons explained infra, we have denominated our
affirmance a new ground of rejection under 37 CFR § 1.196(b).
In accordance with 37 CFR § 1.192(c)(7), we have selected
claim 1 as the representative claim from the appellant's
grouping (brief, page 10) of claims 1, 2 and 4 through 15 and
decide the appeal on this rejection on the basis of this claim
alone. Accordingly, we also sustain the examiner's rejection
of claims 2 and 4 through 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on
Heyl and Ruemelin, since these claims fall with claim 1.
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