Appeal No. 2001-0294
Application No. 09/004,399
citing In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235, 169 USPQ 236, 238
(1971). “The legal standard for definiteness is whether a claim
reasonably apprises those of skill in the art of its scope.” In
re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1361, 31 USPQ2d 1754, 1759 (Fed. Cir.
1994). Furthermore, our reviewing court points out that a claim
which is of such breadth that it reads on subject matter
disclosed in the prior art is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102
rather than under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. See In re
Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 715, 218 USPQ 195, 197 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
citing In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909, 164 USPQ 642, 645-46
(CCPA 1970).
Upon a careful review of the claim language and the
specification, we find that the claimed limitation of “clock
pulses” refers to clock signals that are compared in the tach
braking circuit with pulses of frequency or tach signals relating
to the rotational speed of the motor (specification, page 9,
lines 22-28). It is clear from the specification as a whole and
page 10, line 18 through page 11, line 24 specifically, that
clock pulses are used to activate the tach braking circuit to
brake the motor by providing a reference pulse count for
detecting when the rotational velocity of the disk reaches its
predetermined speed.
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