Appeal No. 2001-0302
Application No. 08/635,614
pages 20 and 21 in the main brief) which were made by the
examiner in said office action. The matters complained of are
clearly within the examiner’s discretion, and we exercise no
general supervisory power over the examining corps (compare In re
Mindick, 371 F.2d 892, 894, 152 USPQ 566, 568 (CCPA 1967); In re
Hengehold, 440 F.2d 1395, 1403-1404, 169 USPQ 473, 479 (CCPA
1971); In re Deters, 515 F.2d 1152, 1156, 185 USPQ 644, 648 (CCPA
1975)). Accordingly, we decline to consider whether the examiner
abused his discretion in these matters. The relief sought by
appellants would appear to have properly been presented by
petition under 37 CFR § 1.181.
The Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph
We take up first for consideration the examiner’s rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph (rejection (a)).
The examiner’s first difficulty with the claims is set forth
on page 6 of the answer as follows: “The distinction, if any,
between the recited ‘torque limiter’ and the ‘torque setting
member’ [in claim 1] is not understood. They appear to be
disclosed as being one and the same element i.e.[,] 51 (Figs., 1,
4 and 5).” We do not agree. In our view, the ordinarily skilled
artisan would readily understand that the term “torque limiter”
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