Ex Parte KRULL et al - Page 11




              Appeal No. 2002-0267                                                                Page 11                 
              Application No. 09/440,496                                                                                  


              limitation regarding Minnesota, we do not agree with the positions and theories set forth                   
              by the appellants.  The analogous art argument has been dealt with above.  In addition,                     
              we point out that in a rejection under Section 103, it is not necessary that each and                       
              every limitation in a claim be taught by a single reference.  As should be apparent from                    
              the guidance provided by our reviewing court with regard to rejections under 35 U.S.C.                      
              § 103, the issue is what the prior art would have taught or suggested to one of ordinary                    
              skill in the art, whose skill in the art cannot be ignored.  It is our view that the requisite              
              teachings and suggestion to combine the references in the manner proposed by the                            
              examiner are present in every case except for the claims containing the Minnesota                           
              limitation. Regarding the argument that Penny Map does not comprise a “board,” we                           
              point out that this was set forth in the synopsis provided by counsel for a third party,                    
              which the appellants accepted in Paper No. 8 as “being accurate.”  With regard to the                       
              allegation that the rejections we sustained are based upon hindsight, we wish to note                       
              that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based                           
              upon hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only knowledge which                         
              was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and                      
              does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a                             
              reconstruction is proper.  In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395, 170 USPQ 209, 212                         
              (CCPA 1971).  We believe that to be the case here.                                                          
                                                     CONCLUSION                                                           








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