by the inventor. Be that as it may, that month is the
critical month and the record contains no evidence, even of
the weakest sort, whether in it anything occurred. (347
F.2d at 871, 146 USPQ at 135).
Like D'Amico, Hill provides little or no evidence as to what
occurred during the period between 14 September 1992 and 29
October 1992. Hill fails to direct us to evidence that would
even explain Mr. Pascal's activities.
Further, while the diligence law permits an attorney to work
on his backlog and related cases, the law also specifies that
"the attorney has the burden of keeping good records of the dates
when cases are docketed as well as the dates when specific work
is done on the applications." Bey v. Kollonitsch, 806 F.2d at
1028, 231 USPQ at 970. Here, no dates or records of Mr. Pascal's
activities have been offered into evidence.
For these reasons, Hill has failed to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that it was diligent during the
critical period.
Hill's charge of derivation and Snitzer's prior conception
we begin our discussion with Snitzer's prior conception. A
showing of prior conception by Snitzer will negate Hill's charge
of derivation.
The Snitzer inventors arrived at the idea of disposing a
periodic object mask adjacent and parallel to a photosensitive
optical waveguide and applying a single collimating light beam
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