Green had written description support for Green's claimed "end
effector."
Green begins its brief by asserting that we did not consider
our own binding precedent of LeVeen v. Edwards, 57 USPQ2d 1406
(BPAI 2000), which Green correctly notes it argued in its
opposition to Wang's preliminary motion 1. Specifically, Green
argues that Wang's preliminary motion 1 should have been
dismissed for failing to set forth facts to support an argument
that Green's claim 144 lacks written description support (Paper
79 at 5)
There were several procedural deficiencies noted in Leyeen.
That the facts were not presented in numbered paragraphs in the
beginning of the brief was only one of several noted
deficiencies. For example, in LeVeen, the movant attempted to
incorporate by reference "arguments" made by its declarants. Id.
at 1414. The issues in LeVeen were ones of anticipation and
obviousness, not of written description support. With respect to
obviousness, Edwards had failed to provide a reason, motivation,
suggestion, or teaching in the prior art as to why the subject
matter of LeVeen's claims would have been obvious, and thus
failed to make out a prdma facie case of obviousness. Id. at
1414. Thus, Green is incorrect that Edwards' motion for judgment
was dismissed because Edwards had failed to set forth sufficient
facts on which relief could be granted (Paper 79 at 5). Not
- 3 -
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Next
Last modified: November 3, 2007