Interference No. 104,843 Paper 51
Kundu v. Ragunathan Page 16
early disclosure of the Atzinger patent, which promoted progress in a useful art by inspiring their
efforts to design around it.
Early disclosure has been identified as the linchpin of the patent system because the
purpose of the patent system--progress of the useful arts--is best served by rewarding prompt
disclosure. Shindelar v. Holdeman, 628 F.2d 1337, 1341 n.7, 207 USPQ 112, 116 n.7 (CCPA
1980). An inventor delays in filing at his own peril. Id., 628 F.2d at 1341, 207 USPQ at 116.
The case law distinguishes between two types of suppression. In the first, the inventor actively
suppresses his invention from the public. In the second, suppression is inferred from
unreasonable delay in filing the application. Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc., 267 F.3d
1334, 1342, 60 USPQ2d 1519, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The order to show cause focused on the
extensive delay and the facial case of spurring as the basis for proceeding under Rule 617
(Paper 3). Suppression must be determined on the basis of the specific facts of each case. Dow
Chem. Co., 267 F.3d at 1342, 60 USPQ2d at 1525. The case law has established two guideposts
for determining suppression: delay and spurring. Delay does not itself prove suppression, but can
support an inference in the absence of an adequate explanation for the delay. Spurring is relevant
to, but not necessary for, a suppression determination. Young, 489 F.2d at 1281, 180 USPQ
at 391.
Rather than focus on the length of delay, suppression must be determined from the
reasonableness of the inventor’s total conduct in working toward disclosure of the invention.
Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1568, 39 USPQ2d 1895, 1902 (Fed. Cir. 1996). A variety
of explanations are possible that can, with the right set of facts, excuse delay and overcome the
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