Ex Parte Toukura - Page 12





                 Appeal No. 2002-1668                                                                                 Page 12                     
                 Application No. 09/531,666                                                                                                       



                 F.2d 391, 395, 123 USPQ 210, 214 (CCPA 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960),                                                 

                 and neither any of the cases cited in footnote 2, supra,3 nor any other decision of which                                        

                 we are aware,4 has specifically held this provision of 37 CFR § 1.104(e) to be                                                   

                 inconsistent with the statute or otherwise invalid.  To penalize the appellant for having                                        

                 relied on a provision of the rules which was in effect at the time of their reliance would be                                    

                 contrary to the fundamental principles of equity and fairness on which the reissue statute                                       

                 is based.  Hester Industries, supra.                                                                                             



                         In effect, the examiner seems to be retroactively applying the November 7, 2000                                          

                 amendment of the rules, supra, by which this provision was removed from 37 CFR                                                   

                 § 1.104(e), but an agency does not have the authority to promulgate retroactive rules                                            

                 unless expressly given that authority by Congress, Motion Picture Assn. of America Inc.                                          





                         3 The first three cases cited in footnote 2, supra, do not even deal with an examiner's reasons for                      
                 allowance.  As to the fourth case cited in footnote 2, supra, while it supports the proposition that an                          
                 examiner's reasons for allowance is part of the prosecution history, it does not, in our view, support the                       
                 proposition that an examiner's reasons for allowance in a first action allowance of the originally filed claims                  
                 as in the application before us for review can alone give rise to prosecution history estoppel.  From a                          
                 historical perspective, the Supreme Court stated that "[o]ur prior cases have consistently applied                               
                 prosecution history estoppel only where claims have been amended for a limited set of reasons, and we                            
                 see no substantial cause for requiring a more rigid rule invoking an estoppel regardless of the reasons for                      
                 a change."  Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. at 32, 41 USPQ2d at 1872.  This                             
                 statement exemplifies the caution and restraint with which our courts view estoppel.                                             
                         4 A lack of response was considered as a factor in the prosecution history limiting the                                  
                 interpretation of the patent claims in Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979, 52 USPQ2d                             
                 1109, 1113-14 (Fed. Cir. 1999).                                                                                                  








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