Appeal No. 2002-2126
Application 08/931,187
Appellant argues that Borza relies on private key/public key
algorithms incorporated in both the server and the client (Br13)
and that only after the exchange of public encryption keys can
the server prepare an enhanced security process (Br17), whereas
in appellant's independent claims, the selection of a security
algorithm is made in direct response to the client's request, not
after an exchange of public keys as in Borza and there is no
exchange of public keys in the claims (Br18). See also RBr5-6.
These arguments are totally unpersuasive. The claims are
open ended and, therefore, do not preclude the existence of other
structure or steps, such as the additional encryption in Borza.
Appellant argues that Borza does not randomly select from
one of a plurality of security algorithms (RBr4: RBr7; RBr8).
As previously discussed, Borza discloses selection from a
plurality of security processes stored on the server, the
security process can be an encryption algorithm, and the security
process can be randomly selected. Appellant has not dealt with
any of these teachings of Borza.
Appellant argues that "[t]he security process as suggested
by Borza '167 is a biometric characterization process" (RBr5; see
also RBr6-7).
This is an erroneous argument. Borza distinguishes between
"security process" and a "characterization process" (e.g.,
col. 8, lines 47-49), although it discloses that the security
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