Appeal No. 2002-2283 Application No. 08/882,513 The problem with the examiner’s position is that the examiner provides no factual basis for these two inferences. As stated in Ex parte Tanksley, 37 USPQ2d 1382, 1386 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1994): With respect to the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103, we find that the cited prior art provides no suggestion which would have led a person having ordinary skill from “here to there,” . . . . We have no doubt that the prior art could be modified in such a manner to arrive at appellants’ . . . [invention]. The mere fact, however, that the prior art could be modified would not have made the modification obvious unless the prior art suggests the desirability of the modification. In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 221 USPQ 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1984) . . . . Here, the reference the examiner relies upon would not itself have rendered the subject matter appellants claim obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art. Ultimately, the examiner asks this Board to affirm the appealed rejection for reasons denounced in In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1570-71, 37 USPQ2d 1127, 1132 (Fed Cir. 1995). This Board recommends that the examiner reread the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Ochiai which, we had thought, put to rest generalized Durden- based rejections of the type here appealed. We find no need to paraphrase the well-stated views of the Federal Circuit. The examiner has the initial burden of proof to show that the subject matter applicants claim is unpatentable. Only after a 17Page: Previous 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007