Patent Interference No. 103,892 Page 13
must be sufficient to show that there is a “cohesiveness in the web of allegedly
corroborating evidence,” Berges v. Gottstein, 618 F.2d 771, 776, 205 USPQ 691, 695
(CCPA 1980). This is determined by a “rule of reason,” Anderson v. Pieper, 442 F.2d
982, 985, 169 USPQ 788, 790 (CCPA 1971), because “[c]orroboration is not a ritual but
a method for determining the veracity of the testimony,” Mattor v. Coolegem, 530 F.2d
1391, 1395, 189 USPQ 201, 203 (CCPA 1976).
To repeat, a showing of an actual reduction must meet the above-discussed test.
To establish priority, Davie must satisfy each prong of that test. Whether or not Davie
satisfies the test depends on the facts.13 Davie must show that the preponderance of
the evidence weighs in favor of the conclusion that the test has been satisfied. To
satisfy its burden of showing a date of invention prior to Grundmann’s undisputed
priority date of June 26, 1986, Davie must show that, more likely than not, Davie
actually prepared an embodiment of the count – e.g., an isolated DNA encoding either
the human factor XIIIa or human factor XIIIb, appreciated and recognized both the
embodiment and its use when it was prepared, and demonstrated that it was suitable for
its intended purpose, prior to June 26, 1986. Where an inventor’s testimony is used in
conjunction with this showing, it must be corroborated.
13 Reduction to practice is a legal question based on underlying factual determinations. Fujikawa v.
Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1564, 39 USPQ2d 1895, 1989 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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