document has not been authenticated and is therefore inadmissible. See Note 3, above. The
inadmissibility of the P. Ex. 2010 leaves Park without any evidence supporting entitlement to the
filing date of the Canadian application, The moving party bears the burden of proof 37 CFR
§ 1.637(a). Park preliminary motion for the benefit of the Canadian application is denied.
b. The Benefit of the Filing Date of Park's U.S. Applications
1) Benefit for the Purposes of Priority in an Interference
In order to be entitled to the benefit of the filing date of an earlier application, the earlier
application must be a constructive reduction to practice of the subject matter of the count. 37CFR
§ 1.637(f)(3). The desired benefit application must describe the subject matter of the count and
provide an enabling disclosure of it. Hyatt v. Boone, 146F.3d 1348,1352, 47USPQ2dll28,1130
(Fed. Cir. 1998); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170, 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
However, these requirements need to be met only with respect to a single embodiment within the
scope of the count. Weil v. Fritz, 572 F.2d 856, 865-66 n.16, 196 USPQ 600, 608 n.16 (CCPA
1978); Hunt v. Trgpi2schuh, 523 F.2d 1386,1389,187USPQ 426,429 (CCPA 1975). Asnotedin
Hunt, 523 F.2d at 1389, 187 USPQ at 429, a constructive reduction to practice requires that "§ 112,
first paragraph requirements need only be met for an embodiment within the count" 523 F.2d at
13899 187 USPQ at 429 (emphasis added). See also, Utter v. Hirag 845F.2d993,998, 6USPQ2d
1709, 1714 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (benefit of the filing date of an earlier application properly accorded
where the earlier application described a species encompassed by the generic count) and Weil, 572
F.2d at 865 n. 16, 196 USPQ at 608 n. 16 (as Hunt explains, "the § 112, first paragraph requirements
need only be met for an embodiment within the count").
2) The Benefit of Park's U.S. Applications
The count is the disjunction of Park Claims I and 10 and Mengal's Claims 1, 14, 20 and 29,
Thus, to prove a constructive reduction to practice, Park must show that each earlier application
describes an embodiment within the scope of at least one of these claims. Park limits the argument
to the count alternatives of Park Claims I and 10. Accordingly, we limit our discussion to those
claims.
Par6 does not argue that an embodiment within the count is expressly disclosed by each
benefit application. Rather, it is asserted that certain of the limitations of Claims I and 10 are
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