Appeal No. 2002-1468
Application 09/038,219
As our reviewing court states, “[t]he terms used in the
claims bear a “heavy presumption” that they mean what they say
and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those
words by persons skilled in the relevant art.” Texas Digital
Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202, 64 USPQ2d
1812, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 2002) cert. Denied. 123 S.Ct. 2230(2003).
Moreover, the intrinsic record also must be
examined in every case to determine whether the
presumption of ordinary and customary meaning is
rebutted. Indeed, the intrinsic record may show that
the specification uses the words in a manner clearly
inconsistent with the ordinary meaning reflected, for
example, in a dictionary definition. In such a case,
the inconsistent dictionary definition must be
rejected. [Citation omitted.] (“[A] common meaning,
such as one expressed in a relevant dictionary, that
flies in the face of the patent disclosure is
undeserving of fealty.”); Liebscher v. Boothroyd, 258
F.2d 948, 951, 119 USPQ 133, 135 (CCPA 1958)
(“Indiscriminate reliance on definitions found in
dictionaries can often produce absurd results.”). In
short, the presumption in favor of a dictionary
definition will be overcome where the patentee, acting
as his or her own lexicographer, has clearly set forth
an explicit definition of the term different from its
ordinary meaning. [Citations omitted.] Further, the
presumption also will be rebutted if the inventor has
disavowed or disclaimed scope of coverage, by using
words or expressions of manifest exclusion or
restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim
scope. See Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1324, 63 USPQ2d at
1380.
Texas Digital Sys., Inc v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d at 1204, 64
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