Appeal No. 2003-0189
Application No. 09/627,892
personnel must rely on the appellant’s disclosure to properly determine the
meaning of the terms used in the claims. Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 F3d 967, 980, 34 USPQ2d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “[I]nterpreting
what is meant by a word in a claim ‘is not to be confused with adding an
extraneous limitation appearing in the specification, which is improper.’”
(emphasis original) In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 301 F.3d 1343, 1348,
64 USPQ2d 1202, 1205, (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Intervet America Inc v. Kee-
Vet Laboratories Inc. 12 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). “[T]he terms
used in the claims bear a “heavy presumption” that they mean what they say and
have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons
skilled in the relevant art.” Texas Digital Sys, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d
1193, 1202, 64 USPQ2d 1812, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “Moreover, the intrinsic
record also must be examined in every case to determine whether the
presumption of ordinary and customary meaning is rebutted.” (citation omitted).
“Indeed, the intrinsic record may show that the specification uses the words in a
manner clearly inconsistent with the ordinary meaning reflected, for example, in
a dictionary definition. In such a case, the inconsistent dictionary definition must
be rejected.” Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d at 1204,
64 USPQ2d at 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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