Appeal No. 2003-1225 Application No. 09/223,765 Apparently, “vsSupervisor” has some secret meaning to appellants that is somehow believed to distinguish over the Carroll reference. The word appears to have no recognized meaning in the art. Appellants’ disclosure does not set forth any particular definition for the word. Instead, the disclosure (e.g., page 12 as originally filed) uses the term in the description of the preferred embodiment. We conclude that the “vsSupervisor” functions merely relate to arbitrary names denoting the functions. The actual requirements of the claims thus are limited to what the functions do, as those functions are set forth in the claims, rather than how those functions are named. Our reading of unclaimed features relating to the “vsSupervisor” functions into the claims would be, simply, the prohibited exercise of reading disclosed limitations into the claims. Claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation during prosecution, and the scope of a claim cannot be narrowed by reading disclosed limitations into the claim. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550 (CCPA 1969). Appellants suggest that the rejection does not comport with the principles of “inherency.” However, under a proper interpretation of the instant claims, one does not arrive at a consideration of potential “inherency.” Appellants have not shown that the rejection is deficient in showing any aspect of instant claim 1, other than the literal term that appears to have been coined by appellants. Since we conclude that Carroll describes what is claimed, we sustain the Section 102 rejection of claim 1. -5-Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007