Appeal No. 2003-1225
Application No. 09/223,765
Apparently, “vsSupervisor” has some secret meaning to appellants that is
somehow believed to distinguish over the Carroll reference. The word appears to have
no recognized meaning in the art. Appellants’ disclosure does not set forth any
particular definition for the word. Instead, the disclosure (e.g., page 12 as originally
filed) uses the term in the description of the preferred embodiment. We conclude that
the “vsSupervisor” functions merely relate to arbitrary names denoting the functions.
The actual requirements of the claims thus are limited to what the functions do,
as those functions are set forth in the claims, rather than how those functions are
named. Our reading of unclaimed features relating to the “vsSupervisor” functions into
the claims would be, simply, the prohibited exercise of reading disclosed limitations into
the claims. Claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation during
prosecution, and the scope of a claim cannot be narrowed by reading disclosed
limitations into the claim. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023,
1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
1989); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550 (CCPA 1969).
Appellants suggest that the rejection does not comport with the principles of
“inherency.” However, under a proper interpretation of the instant claims, one does not
arrive at a consideration of potential “inherency.” Appellants have not shown that the
rejection is deficient in showing any aspect of instant claim 1, other than the literal term
that appears to have been coined by appellants. Since we conclude that Carroll
describes what is claimed, we sustain the Section 102 rejection of claim 1.
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