Ex Parte YOSHIDA et al - Page 7




              Appeal No. 2003-1622                                                                                        
              Application No. 09/146,529                                                                                  


              shown where Holmann teaches a first register for holding a first description indicating a                   
              timing of starting a determination of said condition and use of the timing to start the                     
              determination of the condition.                                                                             
                     Appellants argue that the claims call for a delay in the determining a condition                     
              and that the execution of the instruction is not performed until the condition is satisfied                 
              after the delay period before the condition is evaluated.  (See brief at page 20.)  The                     
              examiner includes some random program segment which is not disclosed in Holmann                             
              as part of the rejection.  (See answer at pages 11 and 12.)  We do not find this                            
              extraneous material useful in the evaluation of the specific disclosure of Holmann.                         
              Here, we find that the examiner is speculating and extrapolating from beyond the                            
              disclosure of Holmann which is inappropriate in a rejection under 35 USC § 102.                             
              Therefore, we cannot sustain the rejection under 35 USC § 102 since the examiner has                        
              not established a prima facie case of anticipation of independent claim 14 and its                          
              dependent claims.  The examiner relies upon the application of the prior art applied                        
              against claim 14 with respect to independent claims 1 and 21.  Therefore, we cannot                         
              sustain the rejection under 35 USC § 102 since the examiner has not established a                           
              prima facie case of anticipation of independent claims 1, 21 and their dependent                            
              claims.                                                                                                     


                                                     35 USC § 103                                                         

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