Appeal No. 2004-0591
Application No. 09/195,362
1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997) and RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc., 730 F.2d
1440, 1444, 221 USPQ 385, 388 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); however, the law of anticipation
does not require that the reference teach what the appellants are claiming, but only that
the claims on appeal "read on" something disclosed in the reference (see Kalman v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 772, 218 USPQ 781, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984)).
Appellants argue that independent claims 22 and 36 describe processing a first
dependent node dependently coupled to the event node including communicating with
the external application and allowing the external application to modify the at least one
rule. (Brief at pages 4-5.) The examiner maintains that the language of the
independent claims does not establish a reference for the term “external application”
and that each of the computers in Du would therefore be an external application that
would modify at least one rule of a workflow. (Answer at page 16.) The examiner relies
on a teaching in the background of Du that flexible execution of workflow processes is
important in a dynamic workflow environment and that a workflow process may need to
be modified after being started. (Answer at pages 16 and 17.) We agree with
appellants that the examiner’s position regarding “external applications” is in error and
that the plural computers in Du would have been part of the workflow and rule
processing system rather than part of an external application. Therefore, we find that
Du does not teach allowing the external application to modify the at least one rule, and
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