Appeal No. 2003-
Application No. 09/
and is filled with a conductive metal such as that
taught by the present invention.
The appellants then urge that “Kitamura [] does not teach at
least one surface groove in a substrate” and that “[t]he base
substrate 100 of Kitamura [] is clearly shown with a smooth top
surface.” (Id. at page 6.)
The appellants’ position lacks merit. While Kitamura does
not state that insulation film 107 is a “substrate,” we note
that the present specification places no limitation on the type
of substantially insulating material that may be used to form
the “substrate.” Nor does the present specification limit the
structure of the “substrate” in any way. Absent any special
definition in the specification,2 we construe the term
“substrate” to encompass or read on Kitamura’s insulation film
107.3
2 See, e.g., In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d
1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
3 The appellants contend that Kitamura’s insulation film
107 “is not a substrate[] and cannot be interpreted as such in
the common sense of semiconductor structures.” (Appeal brief,
p. 8.) The appellants, however, fail to point to any evidence
in the record to substantiate this unsupported allegation. It
has long been held that mere lawyer’s arguments and conclusory
statements, which are unsupported by factual evidence, are
entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d
1465, 1470, 43 USPQ2d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re De
Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705, 222 USPQ 191, 196 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
In re Wood, 582 F.2d 638, 642, 199 USPQ 137, 140 (CCPA 1978); In
re Lindner, 457 F.2d 506, 508-09, 173 USPQ 356, 358 (CCPA 1972).
4
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 Next
Last modified: November 3, 2007