Ex Parte Lawrey et al - Page 5



         Appeal No. 2004-2208                                                       
         Application No. 10/158,988                                                 

              We cannot agree.  Like any other rejection, the initial               
         burden of establishing a prima facie case of unpatentability               
         based on non-enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶1, rests on the            
         examiner.  In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443,             
         1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992).                                                     
              “Although not explicitly stated in section 112, to be                 
         enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled           
         in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed               
         invention without ‘undue experimentation.’”2  In re Wright, 999            
         F.2d 1557, 1561, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  As long           
         as “undue experimentation” is not involved, a specification                
         would comply with the enablement requirement of the statute even           
         if a reasonable amount of routine experimentation is necessary             
         to practice the claimed invention.  Enzo Biochem Inc. v.                   
         Calgene, 188 F.3d 1362, 1371, 52 USPQ2d 1129, 1135 (Fed. Cir.              
                                                                                   
              2  The question of whether making and using the invention             
         would have required “undue experimentation” depends on several             
         underlying factual inquiries including: (1) the quantity of                
         experimentation necessary; (2) the amount of direction or                  
         guidance presented; (3) the presence or absence of working                 
         examples; (4) the nature of the invention; (5) the state of the            
         prior art; (6) the relative skill of those in the art; (7) the             
         predictability or unpredictability of the art; and (8) the                 
         breadth of the claims.  In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735, 736-37,            
         8 USPQ2d 1400, 1402, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988).                                


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