Ex Parte BIEMAN - Page 42




                  Appeal No. 2004-0659                                                                                           
                  Application No. 09/111,978                                                                                     

                                  Hester argues that an analogy cannot be made with prosecution                                  
                          history estoppel because the reissue procedure and prosecution history                                 
                          estoppel are the antithesis of one another--reissue allows an expansion of                             
                          patent rights whereas prosecution history estoppel is limiting.  However,                              
                          Hester’s argument is unpersuasive.  The analogy is not to the broadening                               
                          aspect of reissue.  Rather, the analogy is with the recapture rule, which                              
                          restricts the permissible range of expansion through reissue just as                                   
                          prosecution history estoppel restricts the permissible range of equivalents                            
                          under the doctrine of equivalents.                                                                     
                                  This court earlier concluded that prosecution history estoppel can                             
                          arise by way of unmistakable assertions made to the Patent Office in                                   
                          support of patentability, just as it can arise by way of amendments to avoid                           
                          prior art.  See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. International Trade                                  
                          Comm’n, 998 F.2d 1165, 1174, 26 USPQ2d 1018, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1993).                                    
                  See also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,  234 F.3d 558, 602, 56                           
                  USPQ2d 1865, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Festo I), vacated and remanded, 535 U.S. 722,                              
                  122 S. Ct. 1831, 62 USPQ2d 1705 (2002) (Festo II)6 (Michel, J., concurring-in-part and                         
                  dissenting-in-part):                                                                                           
                          [T]he law of prosecution history estoppel has developed with equal                                     
                          applicability to reissue patents and original patents whose claims were                                
                          amended during prosecution.  By at least 1879, the Supreme Court                                       
                          recognized that the process of obtaining a reissue patent precluded the                                
                          patentee from recapturing that which he had disclaimed (i.e., surrendered),                            
                          through the reissuance process.                                                                        

                                                                                                                                 
                  fairness to the public must also be considered.  As stated in Mentor, "the reissue                             
                  statement cannot be construed in such a way that competitors, properly relying on                              
                  prosecution history, become patent infringers when they do so."  998 F.2d at 996, 27                           
                  USPQ2d at 1525.                                                                                                
                  6   The “Festo” convention used in this opinion is:                                                            
                          Festo I is the original in banc decision of the Federal Circuit.                                       
                          Festo II is the decision of the Supreme Court.                                                         
                          Festo III is the decision of the Federal Circuit on remand.                                            
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