of a patent application (see, for example, In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d
1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989)), it is also well settled that terms in a claim should be
construed as those skilled in the art would construe them (see Specialty Composites v.
Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 986, 6 USPQ2d 1601, 1604 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and In re
Johnson, 558 F.2d 1008, 1016, 194 USPQ 187, 194 (CCPA 1977). Further, as pointed
out by our reviewing court in Phillipps v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315, 75 USPQ2d
1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the claims, of course, do not stand alone but, rather, are
part of a fully integrated written instrument consisting principally of a specification that
concludes with the claims. For that reason, claims must be read in view of the
specification, of which they are a part. "[T]he specification is always highly relevant to
the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the
meaning of a disputed term." Id.
First, one of ordinary skill in the art would not consider a subsequent application
of the parking brake to be an adjustment to the park brake load level subsequent to said
initial park brake load level being applied. Moreover, as explained in the paragraph
bridging pages 18 and 19 of the appellants’ specification, with the appellants’ parking
brake control system, the parking brake force can be adjusted, during the parked phase,
in response to changes in static vehicle characteristics. In light of that disclosure, one
of ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted the recitation of adjusting the park latch
mechanism to an adjusted park brake load level subsequent to said initial park brake
load level being applied in claims 12, 13, 22-24, 28 and 29 to refer to a single parking
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