Appeal No. 2005-2753
Application No. 09/730,238
the prior art as a whole. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 987, 78 USPQ 2d at 1336.
As can be seen by the examiner’s explanation of the cable descriptions in the applied
references, with regard to the rejections of the Group IV and Group VII claims, the examiner
does not rely on “common sense” to provide evidence of obviousness. Rather, the examiner
has relied on the evidence provided by the applied references, e.g., the cable of Tsai
comprising a device power wire, a device ground wire, a computer power wire, a computer
ground wire, and a plurality of signal wires, as the basis for providing for these wires in the
cable of the Herwig device, as modified by either Flannery or by Flannery and Kang, using
the term “common sense” to describe why the artisan would have been led to combine the
teachings of these references which provide all of the evidence needed for making such a
combination, rather than using “common sense” as the evidence itself.
Thus, we find unpersuasive appellant’s allegation that, somehow, our decision was in
error because we did not specifically discuss each and every one of the Federal Circuit cases
cited by appellant. Once again, we do not disagree with these cases, but, more importantly,
appellant has simply not pointed out how the application of these cases to the instant claimed
subject matter and to our reasoning in holding such subject matter obvious, within the
meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103, is alleged to require a reversal of any of our findings and/or of
our decision.
B.
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