Appeal No. 2006-0455 Page 7
Application No. 10/217,378
expertise, such that when reasoned findings are
made, a reviewing court may confidently defer to
the agency’s application of its knowledge in its
area of expertise. Reasoned findings are critical
to the performance of agency functions and judicial
reliance on agency competence. See Baltimore and
Ohio R. R. Co. v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. R. Co.,
393 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1968)(absent reasoned findings
based on substantial evidence effective review would
become lost “in the haze of so-called expertise”).
The “common knowledge and common sense” on which the
Board relied in rejecting Lee’s application are not
the specialized knowledge and expertise contemplated
by the Administrative Procedure Act. Conclusory
statements such as those here provided do not fulfill
the agency’s obligation. This court explained in
Zurko, 258 F.3d at 1385, 59 USPQ2d at 1697, that
“deficiencies of the cited references cannot be
remedied by the Board’s general conclusions about
what is “basic knowledge” or “common sense.” The
Board’s findings must extend to all material facts
and must be documented on the record, lest the
“haze of so-called expertise” acquire insulation
form accountability. “Common knowledge and common
since,” even if assumed to derive from the agency’s
expertise, do not substitute for authority when the
law requires authority. . .. Thus when they rely on what
they asset to be general knowledge to negate
patentability, that knowledge must be articulated
and placed on the record. The failure to do so is
not consistent with either effective administrative
procedure or effective judicial review.
As common knowledge and common sense are not the standard
for establishing non-obviousness, we cannot sustain the rejection
of claims 1-20. The rejection of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Mitsui is reversed.
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