Appeal No. 2006-2452
Application No. 09/797,872
(Fed. Cir. 1992). If that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the applicant to
overcome the prima facie case with argument and/or evidence. Obviousness is
then determined on the basis of the evidence as a whole and the relative
persuasiveness of the arguments. See Id.; In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 1040,
228 USPQ 685, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223
USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1051, 189
USPQ 143, 146-47 (CCPA 1976).
With respect to appealed independent claims 1, 4, and 7, Appellants’
arguments in response to the obviousness rejection assert a failure by the
Examiner to establish a prima facie case of obviousness since all of the claimed
limitations are not taught or suggested by the applied prior art references. After
reviewing the applied Kawamura, Hoekstra, and Kagawa references in light of
the arguments of record, we are in general agreement with Appellants’ position
as stated in the Briefs.
In particular, we agree with Appellants that, in contrast to the claimed
invention, the Kawamura reference has no disclosure of the immediate
termination of a command transaction transmitted from a controlling device to a
controlled device upon receipt of an interim response from the controlled device.
As described, for example, at pages 103, 104, and 108 of Appellants’
specification, the immediate termination of a command transaction upon receipt
of an interim response from a controlled device enables the controller to
conclude a transaction without waiting for a final response that may occur at a
5
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Next
Last modified: November 3, 2007