Ex Parte Keohane et al - Page 4


               Appeal No. 2006-3121                                                                         
               Application No. 10/165,083                                                                   


               forth in the briefs along with the examiner’s rationale in support of the rejections         
               and arguments in rebuttal set forth in the examiner’s answer.                                
               It is our view, after consideration of the record before us, that the evidence               
               relied upon and the level of skill in the particular art would have suggested to one         
               of ordinary skill in the art the invention as set forth in the claims on appeal.             
               Moreover, we find that claim 31 is directed to non-statutory subject matter under            
               35 U.S.C. § 101.  Accordingly, we affirm.                                                    
                      In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent upon the                   
               examiner to establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of                     
               obviousness.  See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed.                 
               Cir. 1988).  In so doing, the examiner is expected to make the factual                       
               determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148                    
               USPQ 459, 467 (1966).  The examiner must articulate reasons for the examiner’s               
               decision.  In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1433 (Fed. Cir.                   
               2002).  In particular, the examiner must show that there is a teaching, motivation,          
               or suggestion of a motivation to combine references relied on as evidence of                 
               obviousness.  Id. at 1343, 61 USPQ2d at 1433-34.  The examiner cannot simply                 
               reach conclusions based on the examiner’s own understanding or experience -                  
               or on his or her assessment of what would be basic knowledge or common                       
               sense.  Rather, the examiner must point to some concrete evidence in the record              
               in support of these findings.  In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386, 59 USPQ2d                   
               1693, 1697 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  Thus the examiner must not only assure that the                


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