Appeal 2007-0370 Application 09/951,560 1 not a separate argument for patentability. Bd. R. 37(c)(1)(vii).1 The 2 Appellant must indicate why these differences confer patentability. 3 Factually, both Horvat and Vaughn teach exceeding the speed limit 4 by a predetermined value must occur before determining a violation; which 5 corresponds to a law enforcement officer’s discretion in issuing tickets. 6 (Horvat, 4:48-55; Vaughn 8:61 - 9:28). Angeloni teaches a predetermined 7 speed limit of 35 mph with warnings at 40 mph and 45 mph (4:26-32); a 8 predetermined amount of time of 10-15 seconds before sending a message 9 (4:55-57), which likewise corresponds to a law enforcement officer’s 10 discretion in issuing tickets for momentary lapses. Horvat, Vaughn, and 11 Angeloni teach and suggest these limitations. The Appellant has not 12 persuaded us otherwise. 13 Finally, Horvat describes an onboard vehicle surveillance computer 14 (e.g. Horvat Fig 2, num. 30) which determines the violations (Fig. 18; 10:29- 15 64). Vaughn likewise describes a vehicle engine microprocessor tied via an 16 I/O bus to a GPS unit and local database. (Fig. 1, refs. 18, 46, 44, 42). The 17 location and speed of the vehicle can be reported to law enforcement by 18 using a GPS transmitting means 44 (9:24-26). All of these circuits are 19 onboard and tied in to the speedometer. Angeloni’s delay means is within 20 the circuitry of the tuned circuits attached to the multifunction speedometer 21 of Angeloni. The Appellant has not explained why the location of the delay 22 means within the controller renders it patentable over the disclosures of 23 these references, especially as the onboard controllers of the references make 24 comparisons, time events, and then decide whether to report the conduct. 1 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2004). 16Page: Previous 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Next
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