Appeal 2007-0862 Application 10/680,675 requirements varies with the nature and scope of the invention at issue, and with the scientific and technologic knowledge already in existence.” Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357, 76 USPQ2d 1078, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Here, the Examiner argues that the Specification does not adequately describe the “quantifiable characteristics” to be selected for using the claimed method, relying on the test defined by University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 43 USPQ2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1997), and cases applying it. That test, however, does not apply to every generic term recited in a claim: it applies only to a chemical genus encompassing compounds that are not defined by structure. See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1332, 65 USPQ2d 1385, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2003): “Both Eli Lilly and Enzo Biochem are inapposite to this case because the claim terms at issue here are not new or unknown biological materials that ordinarily skilled artisans would easily miscomprehend.” Like the “vertebrate cells” and “mammalian cells” recited in the claims at issue in Amgen, the term “quantifiable characteristics” recited in the instant claims is not a “new or unknown biological material[ ] that ordinarily skilled artisans would easily miscomprehend.” As in Amgen, the Eli Lilly/Enzo Biochem test that the Examiner relies on is inapposite here. The Examiner also argues that the claims lack adequate descriptive support because the Specification does not describe how to use images only of embryo organs to practice the claimed method or how to classify embryos according to the properties recited in claim 14 using digital image classification (Answer 5, 6). 6Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Next
Last modified: September 9, 2013