Appeal 2007-1427 Application 09/826,240 representative claim for this rejection because we find it is the broadest independent claim in this group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2004). Appellant argues that “Mittal does not teach reconfiguring the reconfigurable circuit but instead teaches maintaining the configuration of the circuit and reducing power consumption of the circuit by throttling performance thereof.” (Br. 10). Appellant asserts that “Mittal discloses changing power consumption by altering a rate but does not disclose reconfiguring a reconfigurable circuit by, for example, altering a rate.” (Br. 11, ¶ 1). Therefore, Appellant concludes that Mittal “does not teach reconfiguring a reconfigurable circuit as recited in independent Claims 21 and 28.” (id.). The Examiner disagrees. The Examiner asserts that Appellant has defined “reconfiguring a reconfigurable circuit” in the claims as “altering a power characteristic applied to at least a portion thereof ...” (Answer 6; see also claims 21 and 28). The Examiner reads the claimed “reconfigurable circuit” on Mittal’s microprocessor (Answer 6; see also Mittal, col. 2, ll. 14- 19). The Examiner further reads the recited “at least one node located within said reconfigurable circuit” on Mittal’s functional unit that the Examiner corresponds to a node located within the processor (see Mittal, col. 2, ll. 14-19; see also claims 21 and 28). The Examiner interprets switching the functional unit between a normal mode of operation and a reduced-power mode in Mittal as altering a power characteristic of the functional unit (see Mittal, col. 5, ll. 25-30) (Answer 6). In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102, a single prior art reference that discloses, either expressly or inherently, each limitation of a claim 4Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Next
Last modified: September 9, 2013