Appeal 2007-3964 Application 10/295,060 claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Müller in view of Feinberg (id. 9); and claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Kukulka in view of Glenn (id. 9). We decide this appeal based on independent claims 1, 7, and 13, and on claim 9, dependent on claim 7, as representative of the grounds of rejection and Appellants’ groupings of claims. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2006). The issues in this appeal are whether the Examiner has carried the burden of establishing a prima facie case in each of the grounds of rejection advanced on appeal. We interpret representative claims 1, 7, 9, and 13 by giving the terms thereof the broadest reasonable interpretation in their ordinary usage in context as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, in light of the written description in the Specification unless another meaning is intended by Appellants as established therein, and without reading into the claim any disclosed limitation or particular embodiment. See, e.g., In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1830 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 USPQ2d 1664, 1666-67 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The dispositive issue in this appeal is the interpretation of the “second electrical interconnection structure” limitation in each of claims 1, 7, 9, and 13. We agree with Appellants that the plain language of each of these claim limitations requires that the second electrical interconnection structure 5Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Next
Last modified: September 9, 2013