The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive a State of the power to determine what duties may be performed by local officers, and whether they shall be appointed or popularly elected.376 Nor does a statute requiring cities to indemnify owners of property damaged by mobs or during riots result in an unconstitutional deprivation of the property, even when the city could not have prevented the violence.377 Likewise, a person obtaining a judgment against a municipality for damages resulting from a riot is not deprived of property without due process of law by an act which so limits the municipality's taxing power as to prevent collection of funds adequate to pay it. As long as the judgment continues as an existing liability no unconstitutional deprivation is experienced.378
Local units of government obliged to surrender property to other units newly created out of the territory of the former cannot successfully invoke the due process clause,379 nor may taxpayers allege any unconstitutional deprivation as a result of changes in their tax burden attendant upon the consolidation of contiguous municipalities.380 Nor is a statute requiring counties to reimburse cities of the first class but not cities of other classes for rebates allowed for prompt payment of taxes in conflict with the due process clause.381
376 Soliah v. Heskin, 222 U.S. 522 (1912); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923). The equal protection clause has been employed, however, to limit a State's discretion with regard to certain matters. See "Fundamental Interests: The Political Process," infra.
377 City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911).
378 Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 289 (1883).
379 Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905).
380 Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
381 Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14 (1915).
Last modified: June 9, 2014