Property Taxes.—The State's latitude of discretion is notably wide in the classification of property for purposes of taxation and the granting of partial or total exemption on the grounds of policy,1433 whether the exemption results from the terms of the statute itself or the conduct of a state official implementing state policy.1434 A provision for the forfeiture of land for nonpayment of taxes is not invalid because the conditions to which it applies exist only in a part of the State.1435 Also, differences in the basis of assessment are not invalid where the person or property affected might properly be placed in a separate class for purposes of taxation.1436 Early cases drew the distinction between intentional and systematic discriminatory action by state officials in undervaluing some property while taxing at full value other property in the same class—an action that could be invalidated under the equal protection clause—and mere errors in judgment resulting in unequal valuation or undervaluation—actions that did not support a claim of discrimination.1437 More recently, however, the Court in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County Commission,1438 found a denial of equal protection to property owners whose assessments, based on recent purchase prices, ranged from 8 to 35 times higher than comparable neighboring property for which the assessor failed over a 10-year period to readjust appraisals. Then, only a few years later, the Court upheld a California ballot initiative that imposed a quite similar result: property that is sold is appraised at purchase price, while assessments on property that has stayed in the same hands since 1976 may rise no more that 2% per year.1439 Allegheny Pittsburgh was distinguished, the disparity in assessments being said to result from administrative failure to implement state policy rather than from implementation of a coherent state policy.1440 California's acquisition-value system favoring those who hold on to property over those who purchase and sell property was viewed as furthering rational state interests in promoting "local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability," and in protecting reasonable reliance interests of existing homeowners.1441
1433 F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
1434 Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U.S. 165 (1903).
1435 Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 161 (1911).
1436 Charleston Fed. S. & L. Ass'n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182 (1945); Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
1437 Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918); Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 35, 37 (1907); Coutler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 196 U.S. 599 (1905). See also Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585 (1907).
1438 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
1439 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
1440 505 U.S. at 14-15.
1441 505 U.S. at 12-13.
An owner aggrieved by discrimination is entitled to have his assessment reduced to the common level.1442 Equal protection is denied if a State does not itself remove the discrimination; it cannot impose upon the person against whom the discrimination is directed the burden of seeking an upward revision of the assessment of other members of the class.1443 A corporation whose valuations were accepted by the assessing commission cannot complain that it was taxed disproportionately, as compared with others, if the commission did not act fraudulently.1444
1442 Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 446 (1923).
1443 Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
1444 St. Louis-San Francisco Ry v. Middlekamp, 256 U.S. 226, 230 (1921).
Last modified: June 9, 2014