Counting and Weighing of Votes

Counting and Weighing of Votes.—In Bush v. Gore,1854 a case of dramatic result but of perhaps limited significance for equal protection, the Supreme Court ended a ballot dispute which arose during the year 2000 presidential election. The Florida Supreme Court had ordered a partial manual recount of the Florida vote for Presidential Electors, requiring that all ballots which contained a "clear indication of the intent of the voter" be counted, but allowing the relevant counties to determine what physical characteristics of a ballot would satisfy this test. The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause would be violated by allowing arbitrary and disparate methods of discerning voter intent in the recounting of ballots. The decision was surprising to many as a lack of uniformity in voting standards and procedures is inherent in the American system of decentralized voting administration. The Court, however, limited its holding to "the present circumstances," where "a state court with the power to assure uniformity" fails to provide "minimal procedural safeguards."1855 Citing the "many complexities" of application of equal protection "in election processes generally," the Court distinguished the many situations where disparate treatment of votes results from different standards being applied by different local jurisdictions.

1854 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

In cases where votes are given more or less weight by operation of law, it is not the weighing of votes itself which may violate the 14th Amendment, but the manner in which it is done. Gray v. Sanders,1856 for instance, struck down the Georgia county unit system under which each county was allocated either two, four, or six votes in statewide elections and the candidate carrying the county received those votes. Since there were a few very populous counties and scores of poorly-populated ones, the rural counties in effect dominated statewide elections and candidates with popular majorities statewide could be and were defeated. But Gordon v. Lance1857 approved a provision requiring a 60 percent affirmative vote in a referendum election before constitutionally prescribed limits on bonded indebtedness or tax rates could be exceeded. The Court acknowledged that the provision departed from strict majority rule but stated that the Constitution did not prescribe majority rule; it instead proscribed discrimination through dilution of voting power or denial of the franchise because of some class characteristic— race, urban residency, or the like—while the provision in issue was neither directed to nor affected any identifiable class.

1855 531 U.S. at 109.

1856 372 U.S. 368 (1963).

1857 403 U.S. 1 (1971).

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Last modified: June 9, 2014