(1) A previous prosecution is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution when the previous prosecution was properly terminated under any of the following circumstances:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination or waives, by motion, by an appeal upon judgment of conviction, or otherwise, the right to object to termination.
(b) The trial court finds that a termination, other than by judgment of acquittal, is necessary because:
(A) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with law; or
(B) There is a legal defect in the proceeding that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or
(C) Prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to either the defendant or the state; or
(D) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
(E) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.
(c) When the former prosecution occurred in a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.
(d) When the subsequent prosecution was for an offense which was not consummated when the former prosecution began.
(2) A plea of guilty or resulting judgment is not a bar under ORS 131.515 (2) to a subsequent prosecution under an accusatory instrument which is filed no later than 30 days after entry of the guilty plea. The defendant’s prior plea of guilty or resulting judgment, notwithstanding ORS 135.365, shall be vacated upon motion by the defendant if made within 30 days after defendant’s arraignment for the subsequent prosecution. The provisions of ORS 135.445 apply to such a vacated plea or resulting judgment and any statements made in relation to those proceedings. [1973 c.836 §28; 1983 c.509 §2]
Section: Previous 131.430 131.440 131.450 131.460 131.470 131.505 131.515 131.525 131.535 131.550 131.553 131.556 131.558 131.561 131.564 NextLast modified: August 7, 2008