- 183 -
religion, or the desire to prevent the exercise of his constitu-
tional rights. See Argabright v. United States, 35 F.3d 472, 477
(9th Cir. 1994); St. German of Alaska E. Orthodox Catholic Church
v. United States, 840 F.2d 1087, 1095 (2d Cir. 1988); Karme v.
Commissioner, 673 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1982), affg. 73 T.C.
1163 (1980); Penn-Field Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
720, 723 (1980).
This Court has on numerous occasions described our respon-
sibility in cases before us. We have described that responsi-
bility as follows:
It is the well-established position of this Court that
our responsibility is to apply the law to the facts of
the case before us and to determine the correct tax
liability of the petitioner. How the Commissioner may
have treated other taxpayers generally has been con-
sidered irrelevant in reaching our decision. See Davis
v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1014, 1022 (1976), and the
cases cited therein; Teichgraeber v. Commissioner, 64
T.C. 453 (1975). It is conceivable, however, that
there may be situations where a taxpayer should be
accorded some relief if he were selected for audit on a
constitutionally impermissible criterion, although such
situations are extremely rare. Greenberg's Express,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 324, 328 (1974). [Penn-
Field Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 722.]
1. Petitioner's Claim That He Was Singled Out
In support of his claim that he was singled out by respon-
dent when she made the determinations with respect to the Bank
transactions at issue, petitioner contends that (1) the back-to-
back loan transaction involved in Rev. Rul. 87-89, 1987-2 C.B.
195, was, and the National Office was aware that it was, com-
monplace at the time that ruling was issued; (2) although the
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